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THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF AMERICAN LAWYERS
Adam Bonica,* Adam S. Chilton,* and Maya Sen*
ABSTRACT
The ideology of American lawyers has been a persistent source of discussion and debate. Two
obstacles, however, have prevented this topic from being systematically studied: the sheer
number of attorneys in the United States and the need for a methodology that makes
comparing the ideology of specific individuals possible. In this paper, we present a
comprehensive mapping of lawyers’ ideologies that has overcome these hurdles. We use a
new dataset that links the largest database of political ideology with the largest database of
lawyers’ identities to complete the most extensive analysis of the political ideology of
American lawyers ever conducted.
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INTRODUCTION
Reflecting on the role of lawyers in the early American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville
famously wrote, “[i]n America there are no nobles or men of letters, and the people is apt to
mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class, and the most
cultivated circle of society” (de Tocqueville 1840, 514). Noting their political influence, he
further observed that, “[i]f I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply
without hesitation that it is not composed of the rich, who are united together by no common
tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.”
Nearly two centuries later, de Tocqueville’s observations have largely remained accurate
(Posner 2009). In the 113th Congress, 156 of the 435 members of the House of
Representatives and 55 out of the 100 Senators elected were lawyers (Manning 2014).
Moreover, 25 out of 43 Presidents have been lawyers (Slater 2008). Turning to state executive
positions, 24 out of the current 50 state governors have law degrees.1 In addition being heavily
overrepresented in elected branches of government, lawyers have the privilege of exclusively
occupying an entire branch of government. All state high court justices are former lawyers,
and 32 states explicitly require that their high court justices be former lawyers (Barton 2014,
30). All judges currently serving on the federal courts are lawyers, as are all nine justices
sitting on the Supreme Court.
The influence of the nation’s bar extends from elected politics into policy making and
beyond. For example, by some counts, 8 percent of the nation’s lawyers work in government
(American Bar Association 2012). Lawyers are also heavily overrepresented among Fortune
500 CEOs and CFOs (Wecker 2012). Within academia, law schools occupy the “crown jewel”
positions at universities such as Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, and UCLA, with large law faculty
and revenue generating streams (Winterhalter 2013).
Moreover, the American Bar Association has nearly 400,000 members, making it one of
the largest advocacy organizations in the country—behind only the American Association for
the Advancement of Science in terms of total number of members (American Bar Association
2015). The ABA is also one of the largest and most powerful lobbying groups in the United
States.
1
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Given the importance of lawyers in American public life, the ideologies of lawyers is a
constant a source of discussion and debate among both academics and journalists. For
example, commentators often discuss whether law firms are liberal or conservative based on
the reputations of a few prominent partners, or—in the most comprehensive analysis prior to
this study of the ideology of law firms—based on donations to two candidates in a single
election (Muller 2013). Similarly, the ideologies of law schools have been examined using
proxies like the breakdown of judges that law students clerk for after graduation (Roeder
2014). As these examples illustrate, the evidence used to study the ideology of American
lawyers has mostly been anecdotal or incomplete, and systematic scholarship has remained
elusive.
These analyses have remained limited for two reasons. The first reason is that, given the
massive number of attorneys in the United States, any study of the legal profession as a whole
is a daunting task. With more than 1.1 million law school graduates in America (Brown
2013), conducting a compressive analysis of even simple data—addresses, law school
attended, practice area, etc.—has been beyond the reach of even sophisticated quantitative
scholars. The second reason is methodological: a systematic analysis of the legal profession
requires developing a way to place individuals on a single, easily comparable ideological
dimension.
We address both of these issues by relying on a new dataset that links the most
comprehensive database of political ideology with the most comprehensive database of
lawyers’ identities. Our data on ideological leanings is from the Database on Ideology, Money
in Politics, and Elections (DIME). The DIME data leverages the vast number of federal
campaign contributions made by individuals. By scaling not just whom the contributions were
made to, but also by what amount, the DIME data can be used to assess an individual’s
ideological leaning. Our data on the identity of American lawyers is from the MartindaleHubbell Legal Directory. Martindale-Hubbell provides the “most comprehensive database of
lawyers in the country.”2 By linking the DIME data with the Martindale-Hubbell Legal
Directory, we therefore have access to the largest and most comprehensive dataset ever
amassed on the ideological leanings of the legal profession.
2

See LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, available at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/MartindaleHubbell+Law+Directory (last visited January 31, 2015).
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We use this combined data to explore the ideology of American lawyers in five ways.
First, we tackle the question of the ideological leanings of the legal profession taken as a
whole. Second, we consider the relationship between geography and the ideology of lawyers.
Third, we examine the relationship between lawyers’ educational backgrounds and ideology.
Fourth, we explore how ideology varies across firms and within firms. Fifth, we look at the
ideologies of lawyers by practice area.
We proceed in this article as follows. In PART I, we motivate our inquiry by expanding on
our observations about the importance of the bar and by discussing existing studies that
examine its ideological positioning. PART II begins the discussion of the two datasets that we
use in the analysis, which are (1) the DIME database of campaign contributions for
ideological data and (2) the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. This section is more technical
and explains how the two databases were linked with each other, as well as possible sources
of bias. In PART III, we present our basic findings regarding the overall ideological
distribution of attorneys. In the following sections, we disaggregate the legal profession
further. PART IV disaggregates the ideology of lawyers by their geographic location. PART V
analyzes the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by their educational experience. PART VI
presents the ideology of lawyers by the law firms where they work. PART VII explores the
ideology of lawyers by their practice area.
I. STUDYING THE IDEOLOGY OF LAWYERS
We start with the broad issue of the importance of the bar and its role in American politics
and society. We explore these issues in this section by examining existing studies that have
looked at the ideological composition of the bar. In so doing, we note that much research on
this point has suffered from an absence of clear, comprehensive data. We therefore devote
some attention in this section to explaining how ideological measures have been developed in
this literature as well as in other fields.
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A. What We Know About Ideology and the Bar
Despite their political importance, we know relatively little about the ideologies of
American lawyers. It is worth contrasting this with how much scholars do know about other
politically important groups. For example, there is a generally accurate consensus that
Congress tilts to the political left or to the political right depending on electoral outcomes and
the public opinion milieu. In fact, scholars have been able to determine these ideological
leanings very accurately and in a dynamic fashion, enabling us to compare the ideologies of
different Congressional sessions and of individual Congressional representatives and
Presidents (see, e.g., Carroll et al. 2009; Poole & Rosenthal 2007; Bailey 200; and Poole et al.
1997). When it comes to the media, statistical studies too have quantified political leanings,
showing that some news organization are more or less liberal or conservative in their
representation of the news (see, e.g., Barberá & Sood 2014; Groseclose & Milyo 2005). More
recent work has begun untangling how the public’s ideology varies by jurisdiction; for
example, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) develop estimation techniques that rely on public
opinion survey data and that place localities on an ideological scale. Perhaps most apropos to
the work we do here, research by Bonica has used campaign contribution data to open up the
estimation of ideologies across different professions (Bonica 2014). For example, Bonica et
al. (2014) looked at the ideologies of the medical profession, finding that some specialties
lean more to the left and others more to the right. Given that the American Medical
Association is a powerful lobbying and professional organization, understanding the
ideologies of doctors gives some insight into the potential lobbying and policy priorities made
by that organization. Taken together, this literature is indicative of significant scholarly
advances into the exploration of American ideologies, both of the American public and also of
American political and professional elites.
However, substantially less is known about the politics of the nation’s lawyers. Instead,
the scholarship that does exist focuses on specific aspects of lawyers’ ideology and fails to
provide a comprehensive picture of the profession as a whole. For example, within the
scholarly literature, some have approached the question via the lens of judicial selection. Most
recently, Bonica and Sen (2015) posit that since the nation’s judges are drawn from the
nation’s pool of attorneys, they must somewhat reflective of lawyer ideology. They instead
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find that lawyers tilt to the left, while judges tilt to the right. However, because Bonica and
Sen (2015) primarily explore judicial politics, despite using data similar to the data used in
this study, they do not explore lawyers’ ideology specifically.
Additional writing on these issues comes from members of the press and other public
commentators—particularly when the questions turn to the influence of the bar on national
politics. Many conservative commentators have made the point that lawyers—particularly
trial lawyers—appear more liberal than the rest of the population. For example, Trial
Lawyers, Inc., put together an online report with the aim of “shedding light on the size, scope
and inner workings of America’s lawsuit industry,” put forth data on trial lawyers and their
practices. The report comments that:
[I]n the 2002 electoral cycle, members of Williams & Bailey, one of the largest
personal-injury firms in Texas, gave $2.4 million to federal campaigns; lawyers at
securities class action giant Milberg Weiss gave $1.4 million; Baron & Budd, headed by
former ATLA president and asbestos class action lawyer Fred Baron, accounted for $1.1
million; and prominent asbestos and tobacco litigator Peter Angelos’s firm gave $1.9
million. Each of these firms’ members gave at least 99% of their contributions to
Democrats. All told, the litigation industry has contributed $470 million to federal
campaigns since 1990. [Emphasis Added]
These observations spill over into critiques of the Democratic Party for siding
overwhelmingly with the interest of the bar and of trial lawyers. Citing the Trial Lawyers Inc.
study, a 2010 editorial in The Washington Times complained that these liberal ties are
intimately related to liberal-leaning policies, arguing that “the main reason Democrats don’t
include lawsuit reform in their health care proposals is that they are afraid of angering the
plaintiffs’ lawyers. And bill after bill after bill in the Democratic Congress, on a bewildering
variety of issues, contain hidden provisions that would further enrich those attorneys.”3 In a
more scholarly and systematic analysis of Congressional House votes in which “litigious
policy was the main matter of dispute,” Burke (2004, 188) finds that Democrats “voted for the
Why
Liberals
Are
Lawyers’
Puppets,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/16/why-liberals-are-lawyers-puppets/.
3
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2010),

pro-litigation side on an average of 67 percent of the votes” and “Republicans 17 percent.” In
addition, on several of the votes, “the litigious policy under review served Democratic
objectives and so received the vast majority of Democratic votes.” Burke concludes that it was
“an ideological struggle, in which liberals typically favored litigious policies and
conservatives opposed them.”
Taken together, these scholarly and journalistic accounts paint a picture of a liberalleaning bar. However, a limiting factor in all of these analyses appears to be data availability.
This is understandable: it is difficult enough to accurately capture individual ideology and all
but impossible to do so on a scale massive enough to capture (even a share of) the population
of over one million attorneys in the United States. We therefore turn to a more thorough
discussion of the methodological issues involved and how the measures used here fit into this
broader literature.
B. Methodological Approaches to Ideology
The first hurdle to developing a comprehensive picture of the ideology of American
lawyers is developing a methodology that allows for the comparison of ideologies across
individuals. This requires having a way to compare the ideology of specific individuals even if
they have not voted on the same issues (the way that members of Congress do on legislation
or Supreme Court Justices do on cases) and even if they have not donated money to political
candidates in the same election cycle. Although there have not been prior efforts to develop
methods to study the ideology of lawyers specifically, thinking through ways to rigorously
measure ideology generally has been one of the major projects of political scientists over the
last several decades. A great deal can thus be gained by leveraging the insights that have been
developed in those other areas. To do so, it is worth beginning with the area where the
measurement of ideology has been primarily developed: the United States Congress.
Scholars have devised several mechanisms by which to estimate the ideologies of
Congressional actors. The most well known of the mechanisms is DW-NOMINATE scores
(Poole et al. 2011; Poole & Rosenthal 1997). Under the assumptions that representatives and
Senators cast votes that are close to their true ideological positioning, the DW-NOMINATE
methodology leverages Congressional roll call votes across different issues to measure
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ideology of individuals. The method uses the roll-call votes of Members of Congress to
collapse ideology into two dimensions: one is believed to be regarding economic issues and
the other is believed to be regarding social or racial issues. These two dimensions appear to go
quite far in explaining variance in Congressional votes.
One methodological issue in estimating these sorts of votes is that Congressional
representatives need to be compared to each other. That is, viewing Representative Barney
Frank’s (D-MA) votes in isolation is meaningless when trying to understand his relative
ideology. We can only obtain information about Frank’s ideological positioning once we
compare his voting record with other representatives—for example, to those of
Representatives John Boehner (R-OH). That is, we need multiple representatives to cast votes
on the same issue. Lacking this information means that we must search for a bridge to
compare people against each other. For example, given that Frank retired in 2007, we can still
use votes that he cast along with Boehner, and then use Boehner (and others like him) as a
bridge to compare Frank’s record with those of his successors (with whom he did not
overlap).
This strategy of “bridging” means that actors from various institutions—for example, the
Senate and the House, or the 113th House and the 110th House—can be placed ideologically
on a single scale (see, e.g., Bailey 2007). Denoted in the literature as the Common Space
Scores, these consistently scaled scores allow political scientists to compare political actors
across various branches of government. This basic insight—that bridging enables the
comparison of individual ideology across time periods and institutions—provides the rough
blueprint for how it can be possible to measure the ideology of American lawyers.
C. Methodological Approaches to Ideology in a Legal Context
Lawyers present specific challenges when it comes to estimating ideology. So far,
academics studying the ideology of lawyers have focused on estimating judicial ideology;
most notably, the ideologies of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. There are three reasons for this.
First, for many the Supreme Court represents the pinnacle of the American legal system and
certainly attracts the most attention from members of the press and the public. Second, as
many have observed, ideological rifts are becoming more and more palpable (Devins & Baum
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2014). Third, and perhaps most importantly from a methodological perspective, the Supreme
Court sits as an en banc panel of nine judges. This allows scholars to compare, for example,
how Antonin Scalia has voted on the same set of cases as Ruth Bader Ginsburg. There are
consequently fewer obstacles in bridging ideologies because all nine Justices (or some subset
thereof) hear the same set of cases.
The literature here is well developed. For example, in an influential paper Martin and
Quinn (2002) developed flexible scores that take into account not only the Justices’ relative
voting compared to each other, but also how their relative ideologies could change over time.
These Martin-Quinn scores have shown that Justices fluctuate in important ways over the
course of their careers, that certain Justices tend to occupy the important “median” Justice
position, and that Court rulings can reliably be predicted on the basis of little else besides the
Justices’ Martin-Quinn scores. Of course, Martin-Quinn scores are not the only measures of
Supreme Court ideology. For example, Segal and Cover (1989) have developed scores that
rely on newspaper editorials and other writings at the time of nomination, pinpointing the
then-candidate’s (1) qualifications in tandem with their (2) perceived ideology. These scores
have been further combined with DW-NOMINATE scores and re-scaled to test additional
theories of judicial behavior (Cameron & Park 2009). Additionally, new research takes
voting-based ideological measurements and combines them with issue-area voting and text
analysis (Lauderdale & Clark 2014; Bailey 2013). An attractive property of these analyses is
that they combine substantive knowledge of legal issue areas and salience with text-based
estimation. These studies show that Justices’ ideologies vary not just over time, but also
across different kinds of legal questions.
The Supreme Court, however, presents an idiosyncratic example within the law. Not only
do all nine Justices (usually) hear cases together, but the fact that vacancies are staggered
means that we usually have a solid base on which to “bridge” ideologies across natural courts.
The absence of these two features becomes a roadblock when we turn to the ideologies of
lower-court judges or lawyers where there is no bridging to be done. Thus, for lower-court
appointments—including judges serving on courts such as the Federal Courts of Appeals—a
more common strategy for determining judicial ideology is to rely on the DW-NOMINATE
score of the appointing actor. This is usually operationalized by using the DW-NOMINATE
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score of either the appointing President or, in the case where the President and the Senator(s)
of the home state are of the same party, the DW-NOMINATE score of the senior Senator (or
some combination of the two) (Epstein et al. 2007). However, these measures assume that
ideologies across judges are constant—a fairly implausible assumption.
For state court judges, the question becomes even more difficult, as the “identity” of the
appointing actors is a state-by-state patchwork of direct elections, appointments, and elections
plus appointments. In this context, the dominant measure of state judge ideology is the PAJID
scores developed in Hall, Brace, and Langer (2000). These scores rely on a combination of
elite ideological scores combined with public ideology measures. More recently, Bonica and
Sen (2015) and Bonica and Woodruff (2015) have made advancements on these measures
using the DIME data that we also rely on here.
When it comes to the ideology of individuals neither elected nor appointed to any kind of
public office, a common strategy used to estimate the ideologies of these actors has been to
examine campaign contributions. The logic of this approach is that contributions are likely
made to ideological allies. Using this method, McGinnis et al. (2005) examined campaign
contributions made by law professors and found that they are overwhelmingly made to leftleaning political actors. More recently, Chilton and Posner (2015) found that law professors’
political contributions predict the ideological leanings of their scholarship.
Although using campaign contributions as a proxy for ideology makes it possible to study
individuals who are neither judges nor legislators, it is worth noting that concerns have been
raised with this approach. Perhaps the primary concern is the possibility of strategic
donation—that is, donations that are made strategically for career purposes or for other kinds
of non-ideological reasons. We will consider this possibility, as well as other concerns, below
as we explain the data we use here and how our measures were developed.
II. DATA & METHODS
The findings that we present in this paper stem from a fruitful combination of two existing
data sources: (A) the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) and (B)
the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. We discuss each in turn and then explain how we link
the two databases together. While doing so, we pay specific attention to the challenges raised
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by problems with missing data, selection effects, and strategic giving.4
A. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME)
As we noted in the previous section, calculating individual ideologies is not only difficult
but requires a massive data collection effort. We therefore use a recently developed data
source called the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), maintained
by Stanford University (Bonica 2013a). DIME started with the premise of collecting and
standardizing contributions made to campaigns and then ultimately disclosed under FEC laws.
As with other studies that examine campaign contributions data, the logic behind DIME is that
an individual will “put his money where his mouths is.” That is, we can reasonably expect that
an individual will contribute financial funds toward a political candidate, PAC, or other kind
of political entity that represents his or her political beliefs. Furthermore, we can also logically
expect that the target of donations will be more like their donors—that is, an entity like the
NRA will ideologically be aligned with its many donors and vice versa. In addition, we
further expect that it is not simply the target of the funds, but also the amount, that reflects
underlying ideology (within FEC campaign contributions limits). For example, we might
think that a $2,000 contribution to Barack Obama indicates at a stronger connection with
Obama’s ideological positioning than would, say, a $5 contribution to Obama. Thus,
contributions can be thought of having both a direction (in terms of the identity of the
contributor and recipient) and also a scale (in terms of the amount).
Although the machinery of this estimation strategy is described in more technical detail
elsewhere (Bonica 2014), a brief orientation is merited. DIME takes the campaign
contributions data and rescales them by analyzing distances between various points. The key
contribution of the analysis is that it takes contributions data and rescales them into a single,
unidimensional scale that comports roughly with the standard common space score scale.
These “CFscores” range from -2 to 2. That is, from highly negative (which corresponds to
increased liberalness) to highly positive (which corresponds to increased conservativeness).
CFscores are also reported for any individual who has made a campaign contribution from
1979 to 2012, representing some “51,572 candidates and 6,408 political committees as
4
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recipients and 13.7 million individuals and 1.3 million organizations as donors” (Bonica
2013b). This means that nearly 5% of the U.S. population is captured in the DIME data.
A potential source of concern could be that some donations are made strategically—that
is, that individuals could be making contributions in ways that are fundamentally unrelated to
their ideological views.5 This is particularly a concern for those individuals who aspire to
occupy a higher office or who view political support as a strategic tool to another position or
for personal advancement. While this concern is legitimate, we note that several factors
counsel against this substantially biasing our results (particularly when we consider the size of
the sample involved). The first is that strategic giving is likely a concern primarily for those
who have the most to gain—like those involved in political aspects of the legal system. That
is, making a strategic choice in giving might influence how judges, prosecutors, and lawyers
interested in pursing political office decide to contribute. Although this is a sizeable number
of lawyers, it is still fairly small compared to the overall number of lawyers. Second, even
focusing in on this group, the CFscores are robust to factors known in the political science
literature to be related to strategic giving—such as potentially strategic giving to those
candidates who are more likely to win (Bonica 2014, 373-76). Third, when we constrain the
sample to only examine those who both receive and make contributions (e.g., political actors
who are eligible to receive campaign contributions), we find that the CFscores calculated
using either contributions received or contributions made yield the same inferences. Taken
together, these factors counsel against the presumption that strategic giving substantially
biases the analyses that we present here. Instead, we believe that the DIME database provides
the best possible source of reliable data for studying the ideology of American lawyers.
B. Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory
DIME provides a wealth of data relating to Americans’ political ideologies. It does not,
however, allow us to identify attorneys or members of the legal profession. Our next task is
therefore to try to uncover the identities of American attorneys. This is no small feat. To our
knowledge, no national database is kept by the Amrican Bar Association or any other
professional organization. In addition, although many states keep good records of individuals
5

Concerns about strategic giving are discussed at length in Bonica (2014) and Bonica & Woodruff (2015).
Additionally, Bonica & Sen (2015) provide additional discussion of this issue in the context of judicial ideology.
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who are licensed to practice law in their state, no such national databases exists.
Although it is far from perfect, our solution is to turn to private databases for this
information. Specifically, we use the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory. Founded in 1868,
the purpose of the Martindale-Hubbell directory was to centralize lawyers’ information and
make it more accessible for clients and private individuals looking for legal representation.
Although the advent of the Internet has somewhat obviated the need for the MartindaleHubbell database, the directory still contains thousands of entries, spanning all 50 states and
practice areas. Given the lack of a national lawyers database, many legal scholars and
journalists have cited the Martindale-Hubbell database as being one of the more
comprehensive directories of American lawyers (see, e.g., Whisner 2015; Young 2008).
All entries included in the Martindal-Hubbell directory contain some basic information.
This includes the lawyer’s (1) name, (2) professional address, (3) bar state and admission date,
(3) law school attended, and (4) employer type. In addition, nearly all of the listings also
include (5) name of law office/firm or employer, (6) position/professional title (e.g., partner or
associate), (7) undergraduate institution, and (8) specialty/practice areas. Additionally, a
significant percentage of listings included even more information voluntarily provided by the
lawyer, such as (9) detailed employment history, (10) judicial clerkships along with the name
of the judge, (11) lists of prominent clients, and (12) prominent cases argued. Since some
lawyers choose to provide more information and others do not, these last four items are
incomplete sources of information.6 Furthermore, each listing includes each lawyer’s
International Standard Bar Number (ISBN), which is assigned by the American Bar
Association and remains the same over the course of a lawyer’s career. This helps assuage
concerns that a single lawyer could have multiple entries (and therefore be biasing our
findings).
One caveat to relying on the Martindale-Hubbell database is the possibility of missingness
in the data. To our knowledge, no comprehensive study has explored the completeness of the
data contained or collected in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Thus, we do not know
whether the directory systematically underreports or whether some lawyers are more likely to
6

When available, our record-linkage algorithm referenced these last items as a way to augment our
matching algorithm. However, we do not include any information from items (9) through (12) in the main
analysis.
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allow their information to be posted publicly. If data were missing in this way, it could
possibily bias in some of our findings. For example, it could be the case that more
conservative lawyers routinely eschew or disallow their informaton to be posted. If this were
the case, then our analysis would indicate a liberal bias among the bar even though no bias in
fact exists. A similar pattern could be observed if it were the case that individuals avoided
publishing their details for reasons that are superficially non-ideological but still vary
systematically according to ideology.
Despite these concerns, for the most part, we believe that attorneys in private practice are
unlikely to opt against being listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. However, we do note
that this incentive might not be constant across all practice areas. For example, attorneys who
operate within the criminal justice system—for example, public defenders or prosectors—
might have less of a need keep their information in the Martindale-Hubbell directory updated.
Lastly, we note that Martindale-Hubbell does not include in its database those who attended
law school but never took the bar exam (in other words, individuals who could perhaps be
considered part of the legal profession even if they are not a practicing attorney). We have no
reason to believe that this would covary with ideology in a way that would substantially bias
our results, but this is an important caveat to our analyses.
C. Linking DIME to Martindale-Hubbell
Our next task was to link these two databases—that is, to locate the corresponding
CFscore for the Martindale-Hubbell entries. More technical details of the approach are
described in Bonica and Sen (2015), but this quick overview will describe our method
generally. To link the two databases, we programmed an algorithm to locate and pair up
individuals who were located in both databases.
The algorithm worked as follows. First, the program scanned the DIME records to identify
donors who are listed as attorneys—either via (1) self-identification as attorneys, lawyers,
etc., (2) identification of their employer as a recognized law firm or a company or
organization identified as “law office,” “LLP,” etc., or (3) self-identification with a suffix
such as “Esq.,” “J.D.,” etc.7 Second, the algorithm then used this information to search the
7
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Martindale-Hubbell directory to search for possible matches, comparing (1) first, last, and
middle names, (2) suffix or title, (3) address (city, state, and zip codes), (4) firm or employer,
and (5) geographic proximity. The matching algorithm was deliberately calibrated to be “less
greedy” so as to minimize the probability of false matches (e.g., including people who were
not attorneys). This was a choice we made so mimize the likelihood of systematic bias at the
expense of possibly introducing random noise.
We also relied on the Martindale-Hubbell directory information for practice area; these
were compiled from written descriptions provided in each individual’s listing. Since these
lacked structured categeorization, we grouped them into a more general set of distinct
categories using automated content analyses techniques. We also note that MartindaleHubbell includes some additionally potentially useful information. For example, many
attorneys in private practice listed notable or important clients in their profiles. However,
because these sorts of data were provided apparently at the request of the profiled attorney and
not all attorneys provided such data (or did so in a consistent fashion), we did not use them in
our analysis.
Again, we note that one potential area of concern here is selection bias—in this context,
the possibility that some attorneys may appear in one database but not the other. For example,
some attorneys may be active legal professionals but not active campaign contributors. This
would mean they would be absent from the DIME database and have no corresponding
CFscore. Such a scenario raises concerns not just for the study of lawyers’ ideologies using
DIME, but more broadly for DIME’s use in other contexts (see, e.g., Bonica, Rosenthal, &
Rothman 2014). Fortunately, attorneys are extremely active contributors: 422,362 attorneys in
Martindale-Hubbell were also listed in DIME. This corresponds to a donation rate of
approximately 43.4%.
Although this giving rate is very high—about ten times higher than the general U.S.
population—it could be the case that those attorneys who donate differ systematically from
those who do not. To test for this possibility, we performed several additional analyses that
take into account the probability that an attorney identified in Martindale-Hubbell also
appeared in DIME, comparing the results using selection corrections with results that do not
use such corrections. Although those results are not presented here, they show that the
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substantive inferences associated with a larger or smaller CFscore are substantively identical
when using a selection model versus not using one. We therefore move forward noting that
many concerns should be mitigated by (a) the extremely high donor share in the population
and (b) the fact that selection models show substantively similar results to what we present
here.8
III. BASIC DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS’ IDEOLOGIES
We now turn to exploring the basic data structure and patterns for the overall population
of American lawyers. We do so in three parts. First, we present data on the overall distribution
of the ideology of American lawyers. Second, we put this information in context by showing
the distribution of lawyers’ ideology in comparison to other well-educated professions. Third,
we go further in depth by showing how various factors—like gender, experience, and practice
type—predict the ideology of American lawyers.
A. Overall Distribution of Lawyers’ Ideology
Figure 1 displays the ideological distribution of all American lawyers, oriented from most
liberal (negative on the CFscore scale) to most conservative (positive on the CFscore scale).9
The histogram bars here—and in subsequent figures presented in the paper—represent
frequencies. Taller bars mean that more lawyers fall within a given ideology, and shorter bars
mean that fewer lawyers fall within a given ideology.
To ground the discussion and to provide additional context, Figure 1 includes the
CFscores of several well-known political figures. On the far left is Alan Grayson—a
Congressman from Florida know for his outspoken liberal views. On the far right is Ron
Paul—a former presidential candidate and Congressman from Texas known for his libertarian
positions. The political figures placed in between include Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Hilary
8

Additional analyses that we do not report indicate that some traits are linked with a higher probability of
being identified in the DIME database. These include, for example, an attorney being older, male, and being a
partner (as opposed to an associate). If anything, these are traits that lead to attorneys being more likely to be
conservative. Because the data shows that lawyers tend to be liberal, this means that, if anything, we are
underestimating the degree of liberal bias in the attorney population. A fuller test of selection bias via Heckman
selection corrections can be found in Bonica & Sen (2015).
9
A total of 395,254 lawyers are included in Figure 1. The reason that the full 422,362 set of lawyers in our
dataset are not included in Figure 1 is that we excluded lawyers who only gave to corporate or trade groups. For
more informaiton on this decision, see Bonica & Sen (2015).
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Clinton, Chris Christie, and Mitt Romney.
Figure 1: Overall Distribution of Lawyers’ Ideology

Figure 1 reveals four important facts about the ideology of American laywers. First,
American lawyers lean to the left of the ideological spectrum. To help place this in context,
the mean DIME score among the attorney population is -0.31 compared to -0.05 for the entire
population of donors. Moreover, some 62% of the sample of attorneys are positioned to the
left of the midpoint between the party means for members of Congress. Morover, the modal
CFscore is in the center-left. This places the average American lawyer’s ideology close to the
ideology of Bill Clinton. To be more precise, the modal CFscore for American lawyers is 0.52 and Bill Clinton’s CFscore is -0.68. This confirms prior scholarship and journalism that
has argued that the legal profession is liberal on balance. To our knowledge, however, this
figure represents the most comprehensive picture of the ideology of American lawyers ever
assembled.
Second, although American lawyers lean to the left, there is a (slight) bimodality to the
distribution. Although there is certainly a peak of observations located around the center-left,
there is also a second, smaller peak in the center-right. In other words, the ideology of
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American lawyers peaks around Bill Clinton on the left and around Mitt Romeny on the right.
Third, there is a relative scarcity of observations at both ends of the ideology spectrum. As
Figure 1 clearly shows, very few lawyers are as far left as Alan Grayson or as far right as Ron
Paul. This, of course, does not mean that there are no lawyers who hold extreme ideological
views. In fact, Alan Grayson is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and Michelle Bachmann is
a gradaute of the O.W. Coburn School of Law.
Fourth, although the fact that few American lawyers hold extreme ideological positions
may suggest that lawyers are generally moderate, it is worth noting that there are relatively
few lawyers in the middle of the distribution. In fact, there are fewer lawyers who have an
ideology around Olympia Snowe (a former Senator from Maine known for her centrism) than
there are around Bernie Sanders (a Senator from Vermont known for being very liberal) or
Paul Ryan (a Congressman from Wisconsin known for being very conservative).
B. Comparing Lawyers to Other Well Educated Professionals
Although Figure 1 presents how the distribution of the ideology of lawyers compares to
the ideology of prominent political figures, it is difficut to know exactly how to interpret that
information without understanding how other professions fare on this same scale. In order to
provide more context to the ideology of lawyers, we present the same information alongside
the distributions for donors from other well-educated professions in Figure 2. The six other
groups of professionals we include here are technology workers; journalists; academics;
accountants; bankers and financial workers; and medical doctors.10
Figure 2 orders the professions from most liberal (technology workers) to most
conservative (medical doctors). Most obviously, the data presented in Figure 2 shows that
there is substantial ideological heterogeneity in the donor populations across these seven
professions. That is to say, there are well-educated professions—like journalism—that skew
to the left, and there are well-educated professions—like medicine—that skew to the right.

10

All professional information was scraped from the DIME database. That is, the information on an
individual’s profession was taken from that individual’s campaign contributions disclosure forms. For additional
information on this process, as well as robustness checks, see Bonica (2014).
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Figure 2: Overall Distribution of Well-Educated Professions
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Figure 2 also reveals two facts about the ideology of American lawyers that are worth
noting. First, the ideological distribution of lawyers falls exactly in the middle of these seven
professions. The distributions for technology workers, journalists, and academics are skewed
further to the left. This perhaps confirms existing beliefs about the types of individuals who
are attracted to these professions (see, e.g., Mariani and Hewitt 2008). Lawyers as a whole are
much more liberal, however, than three of the professions presented. Indeed, the median
lawyer is well to the left of the respective medians for accountants; bankers and financial
workers; and medical doctors. The difference between those in the legal profession and those
in the banking or finance industry is particularly revealing, as corporate law firms and finance
firms tend to be centered in comparable metropolitan areas and perhaps draw from the same
underlying pools of potential candidates.11
Second, a smaller percentage of lawyers are at the extreme end of the ideological spectrum
compared to the other professions shown in Figure 2. For example, technology workers,
journalists, and academics are all professions with a sizable percentage of members with a
CFscore of less than -1.0. The legal profession on the other hand, albeit liberal overall, has a
much lower percentage of outlier members who are extremely liberal or extremely
conservative.
C. Comparing Lawyers Across Other Characteristics
We now turn to examining our subset of lawyers more closely via a simple regression
analysis. Figure 3 graphically presents a regression using a number of important
characteristics of each lawyer to estimate that individual’s CFscore. The outcome variable—
the individual’s CFscore—is stylized so that a greater value corresponds with the individual
being more conservative. The sample for this regression includes all those individuals from
whom we could reliably extract both the CFscore as well as these various characteristics.12

11

These differences are demonstrated to be significant using a series of Kolmorov-Smirnov tests, which
check that the shape of the distributions are more different than would be expected due to chance (Bonica & Sen
2015).
12
To be more exact, there are 393,240 observations included in this regression.
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Figure 3: Results of Regression Estimating Lawyers’ Ideology
OLS, CFscore as outcome variable
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In Figure 3, each row represents a different variable included in the regression. The
specific variables that we included in this regression are: (1) gender; (2) the number of years
since the individual was admitted to the bar; (3) whether the individual is identified as a
government lawyer, (4) in-house counsel, (5) Big Law practitioner, (6) solo practitioner, (7) a
partner in a law firm, (8) a prosecutor or defense attorney, (9) a public defender, or (10) a law
professor; and (11) tier of law school attended. Finally, we also include an additional control
in the analysis—CD Rep. Pres. Vote Share—which is district-level 2008 Republican
presidential vote share and serves as a proxy to control for how conservative (or liberal) a
particular jurisdiction where the lawyer lives happens to be.
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For each variable, the dots represent the point estimates from the regression (that is, the
coefficients), and the lines represent the 95% confidence interval. When a dot is to the left of
the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is associated with lawyers being more liberal
on average; when a dot is to the right of the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is
associated with lawyers being more conservative on average. All of the estimates are precisely
estimated and are statistically significant at the 0.00001 level (due in part to the large sample
size), meaning that the null hypothesis of no relationship is rejected for all of the variables.
The results in Figure 3 reveal substantive, meaningful differences even within the attorney
pool. For example, several groups are significantly more liberal than the average attorney.
First, we see the clear pattern that women are more liberal than men (even when controlling
for a number of other salient characteristics like years since bar passage and type of legal
employment). This is consistent with the more general observation that women in America are
on average more liberal than men. Second, government lawyers are more liberal than nongovernment lawyers. This difference is comparable in magnitude to the difference found for
gender and is consistent with expectations that government service attracts those who are
more sympathetic with the reaches and aims of government. Third, law professor are more
liberal than the attorney population. This effect is slightly smaller in magnitude than gender or
government service but fully consistent with earlier studies on the topic (Chilton and Posner
2015; McGinnis et al. 2005). Additionally, public defenders are more liberal than other
attorneys.
On the other hand, several traits are associated with attorneys being significantly more
conservative. For example, the number of years since being admitted to the bar appears to
have a strong conservative pull on attorneys. We also see more conservative individuals being
drawn to a career at a Big Law firm (although the effect is small compared to other effects).
Further, being a law firm partner is associated with being more conservative. This comports
with what we see for age, which is that, as people advance in their careers, they tend to be
more and more conservative.
In terms of education, the patterns are a bit more mixed and implicate our next topic,
geography. Figure 3 suggests that attending a Top 14 law school is associated with an
individual being more liberal and attending a law school ranked outside of the top 100 is
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associated with an individual being more conservative. However, geography could play an
important role with regard to law schools, with some states’ law schools being more
conservative and other states’ law schools being more liberal.
To assess this, we include district-level 2008 Republican presidential vote share in the
analysis. This variable serves to control for how conservative (or liberal) a particular
jurisdiction happens to be. Including how conservative a potential district is changes the sign
on some of the variables in important ways. This is most apparent for Big Law attorneys, who
cluster in democratic strongholds like Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New York City, and
San Francisco. Once we condition on how liberal the district is, however, it becomes clear that
Big Law attorneys are actually more conservative than those around them, rather than more
liberal.
IV. IDEOLOGY BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
Our regressions results revealed that the congressional district where an attorney lives is
an extremely important predictor of that lawyer’s ideology. This suggests that there is
important geographic heterogeneity in the ideology of lawyers, and perhaps that the liberal
leaning of American lawyers can be explained in part by where they live. In fact, 65 percent
of Big Law attorneys and 44 percent of graduates of elite law schools are located in a select
group of ten congressional districts with Democratic presidential vote shares ranging from 74
to 89 percent.13 We explore how the ideology of American lawyers varies by geographic
location in two ways. First, we examine the ideology of lawyers by state. Second, we examine
the ideology of lawyers in major legal markets.
A. Ideology by State
We begin by examining how lawyers’ ideological distributions vary from state to state. A
graphical representation of our analysis is presented in Figure 4. All fifty states—as well as
the District of Columbia—are presented in alphabetical order.

13

Those ten congressional districts are DC-01, NY-14, IL-7, NY-08, CA-34, CA-08, GA-05, PA-02, MA08, and CA-14.
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Figure 4: Lawyers’ Ideology by State
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The plots in Figure 4 demonstrate some substantial geographic sorting, one that belies the
idea that the legal profession is a monolithic liberal group. Indeed, we see that lawyers skew
strongly to the left in a number of states. For example, in California, the District of Columbia,
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Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York, the bulk of the ideological distribution lies
substantially to the left of the CFscore scale. In addition to these states that are associated
with liberal political leanings, there are a few states where the left-leaning tendencies are
perhaps surprising. These include a number of Western states, such as Alaska, Colorado, and
New Mexico. In these states, as in California or New York, the bulk of the ideological mass
lies to the left of center. This perhaps suggests a more liberal role of the bar in those states.
However, the more interesting patterns develop elsewhere, particularly in states where the
bar is actually quite conservative. In states such as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South
Carolina, and Texas, the average lawyer is conservative. In some states, such as South Dakota,
the pattern is quite extreme. In these states, the mass of the ideological distribution lies to the
right, with fairly little variance in some cases (for example, in Oklahoma). These are
conservative states to begin with, and the data suggests that the bar might be quite reflective
of the general ideological distribution of the state of origin.
We also note a handful of states that display genuinely bimodal ideological distributions.
Consider, for example, Arizona. Arizona displays a classic bimodal distribution, with
approximately half of the “mass” (e.g., number of observations) over the liberal center and the
other half over the conservative center. The same bimodal distribution is also seen in Ohio
and Virginia. Interestingly, these are also states that are considered to be solidly bellwether
states in terms of Congressional and Presidential elections. The bars in these states, which are
ideologically mixed and bimodal, appear to reflect these patterns.
We also note one further pattern, which are the handful of states that appear to conform to
a more traditional unimodal ideological distribution. These include Florida, West Virginia
(slightly to the left), and possibly Oklahoma (slightly to the right).
B. Ideology by Major Legal Market
In addition to examining the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by state, we also examined
the distributions by major legal market. We constructed geo-coordinates based on addresses in
the Martindale-Hubbell directory. We then mapped the geo-coordinates onto the Current
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), which are census-defined geographic regions based on
urban areas with populations of at least 10,000.
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Figure 5: Lawyers’ Ideology by Major Legal Markets
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Figure 5 reports the ideological distributions of the eight largest legal markets based on
the number of attorneys present in our database. In descending order based on the number of
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lawyers in our database, those eight legal markets are New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA;
Washington, D.C.; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA; San Francisco, CA; Atlanta, GA; and
Philadelphia, PA. To be clear, we define legal markets by metropolitan regions and not city
limits. This means that, for example, lawyers who work in Cambridge, MA, are included as
part of the Boston legal market.
The most important thing worth noting about the data displayed in Figure 5 is that, of the
eight largest legal markets, seven have distributions that skew to the left. The sole exception is
Atlanta, GA. In fact, of the top 25 largest legal markets in the U.S., only three have more
conservative lawyers than liberal lawyers. Those three markets are: Atlanta, GA; Dallas, TX;
and Phoenix, AZ.
V. IDEOLOGY BY EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
We also examined the ideology of American lawyers by their educational experience.
First, we explore the ideology of lawyers who graduated from elite law schools. Second, we
expand our analysis and present the ideology of lawyers who graduated from 50 prominent
law schools. Third, we examine the ideology of American lawyers based on the undergraduate
institutions from which they graduated.
A. Ideology of Elite Law Schools
To explore the patterns of lawyers’ ideology by educational experience, we first
disaggregate the data by the law school that each attorney attended.14 This information is
identified on all Martindale-Hubbell entries. As there are more than 200 accredited U.S. law
schools, we begin by limiting our analysis to “elite” law schools.

14

A complete list of the mean CFscores of the 200 law schools with the largest number of alumni included
in our database is presented in APPENDIX A. These are based on self-reported names of law schools in the
Martin-Dale Hubbell Directory. While compiling APPENDIX A, we excluded cases where there was ambiguity
about the identity of the law schools.
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Figure 6: Ideology of Alumni from the Top 14 Law Schools
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Figure 6 presents the ideological distributions for the top 14 (T-14) law schools based on
the 2015 U.S. News and World Report rankings.15 Those law schools (in order of their
ranking) are: (1) Yale Law School; (2) Harvard Law School; (3) Stanford Law School; (4)
Columbia Law School; (4) University of Chicago Law School; (6) New York University
School of Law; (7) University of Pennsylvania Law School; (8) University of Virginia School
of Law; (9) University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; (10) Duke
University School of Law; (10) University of Michigan Law School; (12) Northwestern
University School of Law; (13) Cornell Law School; and (13) Georgetown University Law
Center.
The analyses in Figure 6 are again presented as frequency counts, meaning that some law
schools have more graduates than others, and this is reflected in the heights of the various
plots (compared against each other). Importantly, these represent all the graduates of the
various law schools who are in both the Martindale-Hubbell directory and the DIME database.
As a result, to our knowledge, Figure 6 is the most comprehensive representation of the
ideology of elite law schools that has ever been compiled.
The most striking result in Figure 6 is that all 14 top law schools have distributions that
lean to the left. That is, there are more liberal alumni from those schools than there are
conservative alumni. Not only do all of the schools lean to the left, the skew is fairly extreme
in several of the schools. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the University of California, Berkeley has
the most liberal leaning distribution of alumni of all the elite law schools. That said, although
the ideology of Berkeley graduates skews the furthest to the left, it is obviously not the only
school with a heavily left skewed distribution. In fact, all of the top six law schools—Yale,
Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, Chicago, and NYU—have a relatively small number of
graduates with conservative CFscores.
Of course, there are a few schools with a sizeable percentage of their graduates with
conservative CFscores. Both the University of Virginia School of Law and Duke University
School of Law have a sizeable number of conservative alumni. To be exact, 37% of UVA law
15

The “Top-14” is a commonly used definition of “elite” law schools. Although the rankings have changed,
the same 14 schools have occupied the top 14 spots every year since the U.S. News and World Report started
ranked
law
schools
in
1987.
See
Law
School
Rankings,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_school_rankings_in_the_United_States#Schools_that_rank_in_the_top_14_.28
aka_.22T14.22.29 (last visited August 7, 2014).
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alumni have conservative CFscores, and 35% of Duke Law alumni have conservative
CFscores. The fact that these two schools have the largest percentage of alumni with
conservative CFscores is perhaps predictable: UVA and Duke are the only top 14 law schools
that are located in states—Virginia and North Carolina respectively—that have voted for
Republican presidential candidates in the last decade (although Obama did narrowly win both
states in 2008 and won Virginia in 2012). Finally, although the University of Michigan Law
School certainly leans to the left, it does have a bimodal distribution that reveals a sizable
number of conservative alumni.
B. Ideology of Prominent Law Schools
Of course, there are interesting patterns in ideology outside of the top 14 ranked law
schools. In Figure 7, we expanded our analysis to the 50 schools with the most alumni in our
database of political donors. The additional law schools in Figure 7 include many state
flagship law schools and other well-known law schools. We have plotted the schools from
most liberal (UC-Berkeley) to the most conservative (University of Alabama).
The more liberal schools are comprised of several of the top ranked (T-14) law schools
that were presented in Figure 6. These include UC-Berkeley, NYU, Yale, Stanford, Harvard,
Chicago, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, and Georgetown University. This
suggests that many of the elite law schools are more liberal than law schools on average. Of
course, as previously noted, many elite law schools are located in exceptionally liberal
locations—like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago—and their graduates largely
work in those same locations after graduating, so it should perhaps not be surprising that these
schools also have the most liberal alumni.
The most conservative law schools are predominately located in the South. The two most
conservative law schools in Figure 7—Cumberland School of Law and the University of
Alabama—are both located in Alabama. Schools from South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia
round out the top five most conservative schools.
Although most of the prominent law schools shown in Figure 7 skew to either the left or to
the right, there are a few law schools with notably bimodal distributions. For example, the
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a near perfectly bimodal distribution with
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both center-left and center-right peaks. This perhaps reflects the state of Ohio’s status as an
evenly divided swing state in the past several presidential elections.
Figure 7: Ideology of Alumni from 50 Prominent Law Schools
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C. Ideology of Undergraduate Institutions
Figure 8: Ideology of Lawyers by Their Undergraduate Institutions
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The Martindale-Hubbell directory also lists where all of the attorneys in their directory
received their undergraduate degree. In Figure 8, we present the distributions of lawyers’
ideology disaggregated by undergraduate institution attended. We specifically provide data on
the 50 institutions that appear most commonly in our dataset. These institutions are then
ordered in Figure 8 from most liberal (Harvard University) to most conservative (University
of Texas).
Of the fifty institutions shown in Figure 8, only five have an average CFscore that is
conservative: University of Oklahoma, Texas A&M University, University of Georgia,
Louisiana State University, and Brigham Young University. All of the other schools have both
average liberal CFscores and median liberal CFscores. There are, however, a number of
schools with a sizable percentage of their graduates that have conservative CFscores. These
schools include Michigan State University, University of Notre Dame, University of Florida,
Indiana University, and Ohio State University.
Another interesting pattern is that the four most liberal universities on this list are also
some of the traditionally highest ranked undergraduate institutions: Harvard, Stanford,
Cornell, and Yale. In other words, regardless of what law school they attended, lawyers who
attended these undergraduate institutions are much more liberal than conservative on balance.
VI. IDEOLOGY BY LAW FIRMS
We now turn to examining the heterogeneity of lawyers’ ideology by the law firms at
which they work. Perhaps unlike firms in other professions, law firms are often perceived to
be liberal or conservative. These perceptions emerge both from the clients and cases that firms
take on as well as from the political affiliations of the firms’ high-profile attorneys. As a
result, one incredibly useful outcome from our efforts to combine the DIME dataset of
political ideologies with the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers is that it allows us to
generate rigorous estimates of the ideologies of major law firms in the U.S.
We use our data to explore the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by the law firms they
work at in three ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers by the size of the law firm at
which they work. Second we examine the ideology of specific law firms. Third, we
investigate the differences in ideology between associates and partners at major law firms.
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A. Ideology by Firm Size
Figure 8 presents the ideology of lawyers based on the size of the law firm at which they
work. The figure is broken into five categories. The first three categories are all attorneys who
work in “Big Law”16: attorneys who work at one of the 25 largest law firms in the U.S.,
attorneys who work at law firms that are 26th through 100th in size, and attorneys who work at
law firms that are 101 through 200th in size. The fourth category shown is lawyers who work
in small practices.17 The final category shown is lawyers who work in solo-practices.18
The first thing to note is that, like the population of lawyers overall, all five categories
have liberal-leaning distributions. The most liberal leaning of the five categories is the first:
attorneys who work at one of the 25 largest law firms. Attorneys in this category have a mean
CFscore of -0.49 and a median CFscore of -0.74. It is worth mentioning that of these 25 law
firms, 22 are headquartered in states where Obama won in the 2012 presidential election.19
The second most liberal category is attorneys who work at the 26th through 100th largest
firms. In fact, attorneys who work at these firms have a nearly identical distribution of
ideologies to attorneys who work at the 25 largest law firms. The mean CFscore for attorneys
who work at the 26th through 100th largest firm is -0.45, and the median CFscore is -0.68.
Attorneys who work at the 101st through 200th largest law firms still lean to the left, but
the distribution is closer to bimodal. The mean CFscore for these attorneys is -0.27, and the
median CFscore is -0.47. Moreover, while the top 25 largest law firms are overwhelmingly
concentrated in large, liberal cities like New York and Chicago, the 101st through 200th largest
law firms have headquarters spread across the country in both liberal and conservative cities.
Finally, attorneys who work in small practices or have solo-practices have fairly similar
ideological distributions. Both lean to the left but also have a number of attorneys with centerright CFscores. The mean CFscore for attorneys in small practices is -0.29, and the median
16

Law firms are ranked by the number of attorneys who list the firm as their employer in the MartindaleHubbell directory. The rankings are consistent with other rankings of the largest U.S. law firms based on the
number of employees. See for example, Internet Legal Research Group, America’s Largest 250 Law Firms,
available at http://www.ilrg.com/nlj250 (last visited February 17, 2015).
17
Small practices are defined as private law practices where two or more lawyers list as an employer but are
not large enough to be included in our list of the 350 largest law firms.
18
Solo practices are identified as law practices that are listed as employers for no more than one lawyer in
the database.
19
The three firms headquartered in states that Obama did not win in 2012 are Bryan Cave (St. Louis, MO),
King & Spalding (Atlanta, GA), and Vinson & Elkins (Houston, TX).
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CFscore is -0.49. The mean CFscore for attorneys in solo practices is -0.30, and the median
CFscore is -0.51.
Figure 9: Ideology of Lawyers by Law Firm Size
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B. Ideology of Specific Firms
To further explore the ideology of attorneys working in private practices, we examined the
ideological breakdown of American lawyers by specific law firms. The Martindale-Hubbell
directory includes the law firm that lawyers listed within their directory listing. This then
allows us to estimate the ideology of specific law firms by aggregating the CFscores for all of
the attorneys who have made political donations who work at that firm.
There are, however, a few caveats that should be noted. First, the ideology of specific law
firms that we report on are the mean CFscores for all attorneys listed as working at that firm
by the Martindale-Hubbell database when we compiled our dataset.20 This means that the
ideology score for each law firm is based on the CFscore for attorneys who worked at that law
firm at that specific point in time. Second, the ideology reported for each firm is the mean
CFscore for all attorneys who work at that firm. We do not weigh the relative seniority of the
attorneys in any way, which means that 100 associates are counted the same as 100 partners in
determining a firm’s ideological ranking. Finally, the ideology score we present does not
represent the official ideology of the firm, or the ideology of clients that they represent. It is
possible that a firm could appear as having a liberal ideology based on our rankings due to a
large number of liberal associates despite having conservative firm leadership and a
conservative client base.
With those caveats in mind, we turn to presenting the ideology ratings of major law firms
within the U.S. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive ideological picture of
American law firms ever developed. In APPENDIX B, we present the mean CFscore for all of
the 350 law firms with the most attorneys in our dataset.21 In the following tables, however,
we present the results for four groups of firms that may be of particular interest: (1) the 20
most prestigious firms; (2) the 20 largest firms; (3) the 20 most liberal firms; and (4) the 20
most conservative firms.

20

The data we use from the Martindale-Hubbell directory is based on the information listed in the directory
for 2012.
21
This means that our list is not identical to a ranking of the 350 largest law firms by either total attorneys or
total revenue. Instead, our list is the 350 law firms that have the most attorneys who appear in both the DIME
database and the Martindale-Hubbell directory.
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1. The 20 Most Prestigious Law Firms. Table 1 presents the results for the firms that Vault
ranked as the 20 most prestigious law firms in the U.S. for 2015. Each year Vault releases
rankings of law firms based on surveys of attorneys who work at firms that have been highly
ranked in previous years. For the 2015 edition of the rankings, over 17,000 attorneys
participated in Vault’s anonymous survey.22 Although the Vault rankings have been criticized,
they are wildly viewed and discussed by both the popular press and legal scholars (see, e.g.,
Aronson 2007; Ciolli 2005; Estlund 2011).
As Table 1 shows, all 20 of the law firms ranked as being the most prestigious by Vault
have a mean CFscore that is liberal. The most liberal of these 20 firms is Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, which has a mean CFscore of -0.953. This is roughly comparable to the
CFscore of Hilary Clinton (-1.16). This perhaps comports with the popular perception of
Quinn Emanuel—the firm is known for having a unique culture that embraces wearing flip
flops and working remotely from around the world.
The most conservative law firm in Table 1 is Jones Day, with a CFscore of -0.213. Even
though this is the most conservative CFscore of the Vault Top 20 most prestigious firms, it is
still a (slightly) liberal score that is roughly comparable to that of Democratic West Virginia
Senator Joe Manchin (-0.13). Although Jones Day is listed as having its largest office in New
York, Jones Day officially does not have a headquarters. The firm’s moderate ideology can
perhaps be in part explained by the fact that Jones Day was founded in Cleveland, and the
firm maintains a strong presence there, as well as having offices in many traditionally
moderate and conservative states.
It is worth noting that all 20 of these prestigious law firms have their largest offices in one
of four cities: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington, D.C. In fact, the largest
office of 15 of the 20 prestigious law firms is located in New York. Given the fact that all four
cities are overwhelmingly Democratic, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that these firms all have
liberal average CFscores as well.

22

For more on the methodology that Vault uses to rank law firms, see http://www.vault.com/companyrankings/law/vault-law-100//RankMethodology?sRankID=2&rYear=2015&pg=1 (last visited January 19, 2015).
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Table 1: Ideology of the “Vault” Top 20 Law Firms
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Lam Firm

Largest Office

Ideology

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
Sullivan & Cromwell
Davis Polk & Wardwell
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
Weil, Gotshal & Manges
Kirkland & Ellis
Latham & Watkins
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
Covington & Burling
Boies, Schiller & Flexner
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
Debevoise & Plimpton
Sidley Austin
Williams & Connolly
Jones Day
White & Case

New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
Chicago
New York
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
New York
New York
New York
New York
Chicago
Washington, D.C.
New York
New York

-0.478
-0.684
-0.629
-0.492
-0.601
-0.719
-0.940
-0.534
-0.363
-0.561
-0.297
-0.612
-0.783
-0.764
-0.953
-0.815
-0.608
-0.735
-0.213
-0.494

2. The 20 Largest Law Firms. In addition to analyzing the most prestigious law firms, we
also analyzed the data for the largest law firms. To identify the largest law firms, we relied on
the list of the largest U.S. Law Firms published in 2014 by Law360.23 To be included in the
list, the law firms must be based in the U.S. The rankings are based on the total number of
attorneys working for the firm within the U.S., and the number of attorneys are taken from
either the firms’ websites or the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Table 2 presents the mean
CFscores for the 20 largest U.S. law firms according to Law360.

23

See Jake Simpson, Law360 Reveals 400 Largest US Law Firms, LAW360, March 23, 2014, available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/518950/law360-reveals-400-largest-us-law-firms (last visited January 19, 2015).
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Table 2: Ideology of the 20 Largest Law Firms
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Lam Firm

Largest Office

Ideology

Jones Day
Greenberg Traurig
Sidley Austin
Latham & Watkins
Kirkland & Ellis
DLA Piper
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
K&L Gates
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
Reed Smith
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
Holland & Knight
Bryan Cave
Hogan Lovells
Littler Mendelson
Perkins Coie
Ropes & Gray
McGuireWoods
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith

New York
New York
Chicago
New York
Chicago
Chicago
New York
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
Tampa
St. Louis
Washington, D.C.
San Francisco
Seattle
Boston
Richmond
Los Angeles

-0.213
-0.426
-0.608
-0.561
-0.363
-0.674
-0.629
-0.562
-0.385
-0.443
-0.297
-0.837
-0.382
-0.331
-0.585
-0.502
-0.675
-0.711
-0.225
-0.417

Although there is some overlap, 14 of the firms in Table 2 did not appear in the list of the
20 most prestigious firms listed in Table 1. The lists are similar in one important respect
though: all have a liberal mean CFscore. With a score of -0.837, Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr is the most liberal firm on the list. Once again, Jones Day is the most
conservative firm on the list with a score of -0.213.
It is also worth noting that the firms represented in Table 2 are from a more diverse set of
cities than the firms listed in Table 1. In fact, the firms in Table 2 have their largest offices in
12 different cities. That said, although these cities are more diverse, Obama won the states in
which all 12 cities are located in the 2012 presidential election.
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3. The 20 Most Liberal Law Firms. Table 3 presents the results for the 20 law firms that
have the most liberal mean CFscores. To be clear, these 20 firms are not necessarily the 20
most liberal in the country. Instead, of the 350 firms that have the most attorneys in our
database, these 20 have the most liberal CFscores.
Table 3: Ideology of the 20 Most Liberal Law Firms
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Lam Firm

Largest Office

Ideology

BuckleySandler
Farella Braun + Martel
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
Morrison & Foerster
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
Hanson Bridgett
Fenwick & West
Goulston & Storrs
Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney
Davis & Gilbert
Wiggin and Dana
Munger, Tolles & Olson
Arnold & Porter
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
Kenyon & Kenyon
Schiff Hardin
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
Leonard, Street and Deinard
Foley Hoag

Washington, D.C.
San Francisco
New York
San Francisco
New York
San Diego
San Francisco
Mountain View
Boston
Chicago
New York
New Haven
Los Angeles
Washington, D.C.
San Francisco
New York
Chicago
Washington, D.C.
Minneapolis
Boston

-1.193
-1.076
-0.953
-0.943
-0.940
-0.939
-0.937
-0.92
-0.919
-0.917
-0.897
-0.885
-0.881
-0.868
-0.853
-0.853
-0.839
-0.837
-0.824
-0.819

Of these 20 firms, only three appear in Table 1 or Table 2: Quinn Emanuel and Cleary
Gottlieb appeared in the list of the 20 most prestigious firms presented in Table 1, and Wilmer
Hale appeared in the list of the 20 largest law firms presented in Table 2. The most liberal
firm in Table 3 is BuckleySandler. With a mean CFscore of -1.193, BuckleySandler has a
similar ideology score to Hillary Clinton (who has a CFscore of -1.16). The twentieth most
liberal firm in the list is Foley Hoag. With a mean CFscore of -0.819, Foley Hoag has a
similar ideology score to Bill Clinton (who has a CFscore of -0.68).
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4. The 20 Most Conservative Law Firms. Table 4 presents the results for the 20 law firms
that have the most conservative mean CFscores. Once again, just like with the liberal firms,
these are the 20 firms that have the most conservative CFscores of the 350 firms that have the
most attorneys in our database.
Table 4: Ideology of the 20 Most Conservative Law Firms
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Lam Firm

Largest Office

Ideology

Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada
Warner Norcross & Judd
Balch & Bingham
Kirton McConkie
Burleson
Phelps Dunbar
Varnum
McAfee & Taft
Krieg DeVault
Cox Smith Matthews
Jones, Walker, Waechter
Kelly Hart & Hallman
Hall Booth Smith & Slover
Miller & Martin
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz
McDonald Hopkins
Jackson Walker
Winstead
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister

Ridgeland (MS)
Grand Rapids (MI)
Birmingham (AL)
Salt Lake City
Houston
New Orleans
Grand Rapids (MI)
Oklahoma City
Indianapolis
San Antonio
New Orleans
Fort Worth
Atlanta
Chattanooga
Memphis
Cleveland
Dallas
Dallas
Phoenix
Cincinnati

0.943
0.658
0.572
0.508
0.467
0.452
0.449
0.447
0.446
0.435
0.423
0.422
0.400
0.387
0.365
0.364
0.340
0.326
0.320
0.310

None of the 20 firms listed in Table 4 appeared in the list of the most prestigious firms in
Table 1 or the largest firms in Table 2. Additionally, these firms are from a different set of
cities than the firms from Tables 1, 2, and 3. The firms in Table 4 are overwhelmingly from
states that Obama lost in the 2012 presidential election. The four exceptions are the two firms
located in Michigan (#2 Warner Norcross & Judd and #7 Varnum) and the two firms located
in Ohio (#16 McDonald Hopkins and #20 Taft, Stettinius & Hollister).
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It is also worth noting that the most conservative firm in Table 4—Butler, Snow, O’Mara,
Stevens & Cannada—has a less extreme average CFscore than the three most liberal firms
presented in Table 3. Additionally, the twentieth most conservative firm in Table 4—Taft,
Stettinius & Hollister—has a much more moderate CFscore than the twentieth most liberal
firm in Table 3. In fact, with a mean CFscore of 0.31, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister has a mean
ideology comparable to that of centrist Republican Senator Olympia Snowe from Maine
(0.29).
C. Ideology of Partners v. Associates
Of course, not all of the attorneys who work at a given law firm have ideologies that
match the firm average. In fact, within many of the firms there are likely to be cleavages along
a number of key dimensions. One key dimension we further explore in this section is the
ideology of law firm associates compared to law firm partners. Figure 10 shows the
disaggregated average ideology for associates and partners at 30 major law firms.24
There are three patterns worth noting in Figure 10. First, at all 30 of these law firms, the
partners are more conservative than the associates on average. This can likely be explained at
least in part by the fact that partners are more likely to be older, richer, male, and white than
the associates at their firms. All four of these characteristics are associated with conservative
political leanings.
Second, the differences between the average CFscores for associates and partners at these
30 law firms are relatively small. There are several possible explanations for this
phenomenon. First, law students may choose to go work for law firms where the partners’
political leanings are close to their own. Second, law firms extend offers to law students who
they believe share their views (either based on the activities listed on their resumes or the
views the student expressed during interviews). Third, new associates may adopt the views of
other attorneys at their law firm over time. Fourth, both partners and associates have political
ideologies that reflect the cities where they live—either because of selection bias or

24

The firms studied are the 30 firms that have the most lawyers included in our database. There are two
reasons for focusing on the firms with the largest number of lawyers in our database. First, our estimates are
likely to be more reliable when they are based on a larger number of observations. Second, firms with larger
numbers of attorneys in our database are also well known firms that are likely to be of interest to readers.

42

acculturation—and that associates and partners in the same city are likely to share similar
views. We believe that all four of these explanations are plausible and not mutually exclusive.
Figure 10: Ideology of Associates Compared to Partners
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●

Third, very few of these firms have conservative partners or associates. There are only
three firms where the partners have an average CFscore that is conservative. Those firms are
Baker Botts, Fullbright & Jaworski, and Vinson & Elkins. Notably, all three firms are based in
Houston, Texas. Moreover, there are only two firms where the average CFscore for associates
is conservative: Baker Botts and Vinson & Elkins. Even though these firms are conservative
on average, their CFscores are still fairly moderate. To put things in perspective, there are
eleven firms whose partners have an average CFscore more liberal than -0.50, but not a single
one of these firms has a CFscore more conservative than 0.50.
VII. IDEOLOGY BY PRACTICE AREA
There are likely considerable differences in the ideologies of lawyers based on the type of
law that they practice. For example, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that, on average,
lawyers who specialize in mergers and acquisitions have different political views than lawyers
who specialize in immigration law. We explore the ideological distributions of lawyers based
on the kind of law they practice in two ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers based
on the area of law they claim to specialize. Second, we examine the ideology of lawyers who
work as public defenders and prosecutors.
A. Ideology by Practice Area Overall
We begin by examining the ideology of lawyers based on their practice area. To do so, we
rely on the practice areas that are listed on attorneys’ profiles in the Martindale-Hubbell
directory. It is important to note that some lawyers in the directory do not have any practice
areas listed while other lawyers in the directory have several listed. Moreover, the available
categories may not be consistently used. For example, even if two lawyers both work on the
same deals, the practice area for one attorney may be listed as “Mergers & Acquisitions”
while another may be listed as “Corporate Law.” Finally, it may be the case that missing
practice area information is not random. In other words, our data on practice areas may be
biased because this information may not be equally likely to be available for all attorneys.
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Figure 11: Ideology of Lawyers by Practice Area
OLS, CFscore as outcome variable
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0.4

With these caveats in mind, examining the relationship between practice area and lawyers’
ideology can still reveal interesting—although imperfect—information. Figure 11 presents the
regression results that estimate the CFscores of lawyers while including variables for the 48
practice areas that appear most commonly in the Martindale-Hubbell database. In addition to
the variables for practice areas, the regression also includes all of the variables included in the
regression presented in Figure 3 as controls. As with Figure 3, the regression results presented
in Figure 11 are presented graphically—the dots for each variable are the point estimates and
the line is the 95% confidence interval. Variables where the confidence interval does not cross
the vertical line are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Estimates to the left of the
vertical line mean that the variable is associated with more liberal CFscores, and estimates to
the right of the vertical line mean that the variable is associated with more conservative
CFscores.
It is important to note, however, that Figure 11 reports regression results that control for a
number of key characteristics of the lawyers included in the regression. In other words, a
practice area with a negative (positive) coefficient means that lawyers with that practice area
listed on the Martindale-Hubbell directory are likely to be more liberal (conservative) than a
similarly situated lawyer who practices in another area. What it does not mean is that that the
lawyers working in that practice area are all liberal (conservative).
In Figure 11, the 48 practice areas included in the regression are listed from most
conservative to most liberal. Seventeen of the practice areas are associated with more
conservative CFscores in a statistically significant way. The most conservative of which is oil
& gas law. Additionally, sixteen of the practice areas are associated with more liberal
CFscores in a statistically significant way. The practice that predicts the most liberal CFscore
is entertainment law.
B. Ideology of Prosecutors v. Defense Attorneys
As a final examination of the ideology of American lawyers, we explored the political
leanings of individuals who are either public defenders or prosecutors. To do so, we subset
our database based on how the lawyers identified their title or employer. Public defenders
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were identified as anyone who listed their profession as being a “defender.”25 Prosecutors
were identified as anyone who listed their profession as being related to a district attorney,
state’s attorney, or attorney general.26 Although this process is not perfect, it did produce a
sample of over 1,300 public defenders and a sample of over 6,000 prosecutors. The ideologies
of these two groups of attorneys are reported in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Ideology of Public Defenders & Prosecutors
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There are several things worth noting about the patterns revealed in Figure 12. First,
unsurprisingly, public defenders lean far to the left. The mean CFscore for public defenders is
roughly -1.00, which is comparable to that of Hillary Clinton’s CFscore. Additionally, there
are many public defenders who have views that are on the extreme end of the distribution. In
fact, the modal CFscore for public defenders is greater than -1.5 (roughly comparable to the
ideology of liberal congressman Alan Grayson). That said, there are some conservative public
defenders. To be exact, roughly 17.5% of public defenders in our dataset have CFscores that
25

To be more precise, we searched our combined dataset for the following phrases: “Defenders A”, “Fed.
Def”, “Capital Def”, “Federal Defenders”, “Defender”, or “Capital Def”.
26
We specifically searched our data for the following terms: “Atty. Gen.”, “Dist. Atty.”, “Asst. Atty. Gen.”,
“Atty. General”, “State Atty. Off.”, “Asst. State Atty.”, “Co. Atty’s. Off.”, “Atty. Gen.”, or “State’s Atty.”.
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are to the right of center. Although there are very few conservative public defenders, the fact
that it is not a null set may be surprising to some readers.
Second, although they do not lean as far to the left as public defenders, prosecutors are
still liberal. In fact, prosecutors are more liberal than lawyers overall. The mean CFscore for
prosecutors is roughly -0.50. This is slightly to the left of lawyers overall (-0.31), which is
perhaps surprising given the contrast that is often drawn between public defenders being
liberal and prosecutors being conservative (see, e.g., Folsom 2013; Smolla 2005). This
complicates any narrative that suggests that conservatives are drawn to prosecution while
liberals are drawn to public defense. It is also worth noting that the ideological distribution of
prosecutors is closer to being bimodal. In fact, 34% of prosecutors have CFscores to the right
of center (compared to just 17.5% of public defenders). Taken together, our data reveals that
although public defenders are more liberal than prosecutors, both groups are still more liberal
than lawyers overall.
CONCLUSION
We conclude where we started, with the idea that lawyers occupy an extremely prominent
role in American politics and society. As a result, how the bar operates—its partisan
inclinations and ideological proclivities—is especially important. In total, lawyers control
two-thirds of the three branches of the federal government. Understanding how this
population as a whole behaves is not only descriptively interesting, but also illuminating in
terms of understanding the influence wielded by this very significant group.
In this article, we have leveraged two massive datasets to offer a comprehensive analysis
of the ideology of American lawyers. The first dataset is the DIME database at Stanford
University. The DIME database uses data on campaign contributions to place individuals on a
single ideological scale. We then linked this data to the second dataset, which is the famous
Martindale-Hubbell directory, which captures a comprehensive snapshot of the nation’s
attorneys. Doing so enables us to explore in a systematic fashion the ideological leanings of
nearly half a million U.S. attorneys. We do so using one consistent scale (CFscores) which
places these attorneys on a single, ideological dimension and allows us to compare attorneys
as a whole to other political actors, attorneys to other professions, graduates of various law
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schools to each other, and within and across law firms.
Using the novel dataset we created by combining the DIME database and the MartindaleHubbell directory, we have completed what we believe to be the most comprehensive look
into the ideology of American lawyers ever conducted. Our results not only confirm existing
conventional wisdoms, but also reveal heterogeneity within the profession that previously has
gone unexplored. In short, our results reveal the political ideologies of America’s “highest
political class” (de Tocqueville 1840, 514).
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Appendix A: Ideology of the 200 Law Schools with Most Donors
Law School
Albany Law School
American University
Appalachian School of Law
Arizona State University
Ave Maria University
Barry University
Baylor University
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Birmingham Law School
Boston College
Boston University
Brigham Young University
Brooklyn Law School
California Western School of Law
Campbell University
Capital University
Case Western Reserve University
Catholic University
Chapman University
Charlotte School of Law
Chicago Kent College of Law
City University of New York
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
Columbia University
Cornell University
Creighton University
Cumberland University
DePaul University
Dickinson Law
Drake University
Drexel University
Duke University
Duquesne University
Emory University
Florida A & M University
Florida Coastal School of Law
Florida State University
Fordham University
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Mean
-0.270
-0.834
0.090
-0.194
0.555
-0.157
0.040
-0.839
0.023
-0.820
-0.930
0.828
-0.780
-0.445
-0.079
-0.041
-0.521
-0.624
-0.159
-1.333
-0.712
-0.758
-0.327
-0.882
-0.785
-0.613
0.382
-0.824
-0.337
-0.259
-0.402
-0.605
-0.144
-0.556
-0.505
-0.086
-0.207
-0.773

Franklin Pierce Law Center
George Mason University
George Washington University
Georgetown University
Georgia State University
Golden Gate University
Gonzaga University
Hamline University
Harvard University
Hofstra University
Howard University
Indiana University Bloomington
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, GA
John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL
Lewis & Clark Law School
Louisiana State University
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
Loyola University
Marquette University
University of Massachusetts
McGeorge School of Law
McGill University
Mercer University
Michigan State University
Mississippi College School of Law
Nashville School of Law
National University
University of New England
New York Law School
North Carolina Central University
Northeastern University
Northern Illinois University
Northwestern University
University of Notre Dame
Nova Southeastern University
New York University
Ohio Northern University
Ohio State University
Oklahoma City University
Pace University
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-0.417
-0.253
-0.841
-0.821
-0.151
-0.941
-0.404
-0.380
-0.816
-0.598
-1.170
-0.713
-0.025
-0.131
-0.626
-1.048
0.278
-0.400
-0.551
-0.502
-0.717
-0.713
-0.583
0.137
-0.178
0.192
0.116
-0.299
-0.558
-0.658
-0.503
-1.072
-1.261
-0.839
-0.196
-0.224
-0.950
0.059
-0.222
0.131
-0.410

Pennsylvania State University
Pepperdine University
Quinnipiac University
Regent University
Roger Williams University
Rutgers University
Saint Louis University
Salmon P. Chase College of Law
San Francisco Law School
San Joaquin College of Law
Santa Clara University
Seattle University
Seton Hall University School of Law
South Texas College of Law
Southern Illinois University
Southern Methodist University
Southern University
Southwestern Law School
St. John’s University, Collegeville, MN
St. John’s University, New York, NY
St. Louis University
St. Mary’s University School of Law
St. Thomas University School of Law
Stanford University
State University of New York at Buffalo
Stetson University
Suffolk University
Syracuse University
Temple University
Texas Tech University
Texas Wesleyan University
Thomas Jefferson University
Thomas M. Cooley Law School
Thurgood Marshall School of Law
Touro College
Tulane University
University of Akron
University of Alabama
University of Arizona
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
University of Arkansas, Little Rock
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-0.154
-0.308
-0.410
0.264
-0.386
-0.661
-0.752
-0.026
-0.980
-0.041
-0.816
-0.938
-0.467
-0.080
-0.634
0.029
-0.377
-0.733
-0.301
-0.483
-0.661
0.047
-0.147
-0.878
-0.413
0.015
-0.637
-0.618
-0.701
0.236
0.047
-0.171
-0.204
-0.962
-0.560
-0.563
-0.123
0.066
-0.776
-0.237
-0.290

University of Baltimore
University of California, Berkeley
University of California, Davis
University of California, Los Angeles
University of California, Hastings
University of Chicago
University of Cincinnati
University of Charleston
University of Colorado, Boulder
University of Connecticut
University of Dayton
University of Denver
University of Detroit
University of Florida
University of Georgia
University of Hawaii
University of Houston
University of Idaho
University of Illinois
University of Iowa
University of Kansas
University of Kentucky
University of La Verne
University of Louisville
University of Maine
University of Maryland
University of Miami
University of Michigan
University of Minnesota
University of Mississippi
University of Missouri
University of Missouri, Kansas City
University of Montana
University of Nebraska
University of New Hampshire
University of New Mexico
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
University of North Dakota
University of Oklahoma
University of Oregon
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-0.519
-1.155
-0.812
-0.941
-1.125
-0.833
-0.226
0.333
-0.829
-0.654
0.028
-0.769
-0.364
-0.214
-0.185
-0.593
-0.149
0.212
-0.865
-0.688
-0.391
0.039
-0.428
-0.118
-1.013
-0.768
-0.376
-0.776
-0.907
0.406
-0.197
-0.450
-0.630
-0.005
-0.140
-0.853
-0.391
-0.552
0.229
0.062
-1.047

University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh
University of Richmond
University of San Diego
University of South Carolina
University of South Dakota
University of Southern California
University of St. Thomas
University of Tennessee, Chattanooga
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
University of Texas, Austin
University of Toledo
University of Toronto
University of Tulsa
University of Utah
University of Vermont
University of Virginia
University of Washington
University of West Los Angeles
University of Wisconsin
University of Wyoming
Valparaiso University
Vanderbilt University
Villanova University
Wake Forest University
Washburn University
University of Washington
Washington and Lee University
Washington University in St. Louis
Wayne State University
West Virginia University
Western New England
Western State University
Whittier College
Widener University
Willamette University
William & Mary
William Mitchell College of Law
William S. Boyd School of Law
Yale University
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-0.865
-0.386
-0.482
-0.256
0.171
0.061
-0.851
0.070
-0.443
-0.267
-0.165
-0.052
-1.006
-0.109
-0.487
-0.758
-0.719
-1.005
-0.451
-0.843
0.426
-0.183
-0.556
-0.394
-0.349
-0.151
-0.806
-0.401
-0.738
-0.311
-0.204
-0.620
-0.308
-0.461
-0.229
-0.571
-0.414
-0.680
-0.332
-0.913

APPENDIX B: IDEOLOGY OF 350 LARGE AMERICAN LAW FIRMS
Law Firm
Adams and Reese
Adelson, Testan, Brundo & Jimenez
Akerman Senterfitt
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis
Alston & Bird
Andrews Kurth
Archer & Greiner
Arent Fox
Armstrong Teasdale
Arnall Golden Gregory
Arnold & Porter
Arnstein & Lehr
Baker & Daniels
Baker & Hostetler
Baker & McKenzie
Baker Botts
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz
Balch & Bingham
Ballard Spahr
Barnes & Thornburg
Bass, Berry & Sims
Becker & Poliakoff
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff
Best Best & Krieger
Bingham Greenebaum Doll
Bingham McCutchen
Blank Rome
Bodman
Boies, Schiller & Flexner
Bond, Schoeneck & King
Bowman and Brooke
Bracewell & Giuliani
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
Bricker & Eckler
Briggs and Morgan
Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione
Broad and Cassel
Brown Rudnick
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Headquarters
New Orleans
Van Nuys, CA
Miami
Washington, D.C.
Los Angeles
Atlanta
Houston
Haddonfield, NJ
Washington, D.C.
St. Louis
Atlanta
Washington, D.C.
Chicago
Indianapolis
Cleveland
Chicago
Houston
Memphis
Birmingham, AL
Philadelphia
Indianapolis
Nashville
Fort Lauderdale
Cleveland
Riverside, CA
Indianapolis
Boston
Philadelphia
Detroit
New York
Syracuse, NY
Minneapolis
Houston
Birmingham, AL
Columbus, OH
Minneapolis
Chicago
Orlando
Boston

Mean
0.149
-0.504
-0.18
-0.318
-0.484
-0.149
0.216
-0.439
-0.509
-0.122
0.061
-0.868
-0.771
-0.082
-0.122
-0.429
0.283
0.365
0.572
-0.578
0.165
0.035
-0.325
0.13
-0.283
0.229
-0.762
-0.157
-0.111
-0.783
0.063
-0.263
0.099
0.285
0.093
-0.338
-0.49
-0.222
-0.628

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
Bryan Cave
Buchalter Nemer
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney
BuckleySandler
Burleson
Burns & Levinson
Burr & Forman
Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada
Butzel Long
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
Cahill Gordon & Reindel
Calfee, Halter & Griswold
Carlton Fields
Chadbourne & Parke
Chapman and Cutler
Choate, Hall & Stewart
Clark Hill
Clausen Miller
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
Cohen & Grigsby
Cole, Scott & Kissane
Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey,
Morrow & Schefer
Cooley
Covington & Burling
Cox Smith Matthews
Cozen O’Connor
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
Crowe & Dunlevy
Crowell & Moring
Crowley Fleck
Cullen and Dykman
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
Davis & Gilbert
Davis Graham & Stubbs
Davis Polk & Wardwell
Davis Wright Tremaine
Day Pitney
Debevoise & Plimpton
Dechert
Dewey & LeBoeuf
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Denver
St. Louis
Los Angeles
Pittsburgh
Washington, D.C.
Houston
Boston
Birmingham, AL
Ridgeland, MS
Detroit
New York
New York
Cleveland
Tampa
New York
Chicago
Boston
Detroit
Chicago
New York
Pittsburgh
Miami
Hollywood, FL

-0.44
-0.331
-0.57
-0.203
-1.193
0.467
-0.625
0.215
0.943
-0.054
-0.495
-0.458
0.143
-0.322
-0.537
-0.5
-0.716
-0.12
-0.316
-0.94
0.084
-0.114
-0.565

Palo Alto
Washington, D.C.
San Antonio
Philadelphia
New York
Oklahoma City
Washington, D.C.
Billings, MT
Garden City, NY
New York
New York
Denver
New York
Seattle
Hartford
New York
Philadelphia
New York

-0.548
-0.612
0.435
-0.509
-0.684
0.181
-0.67
-0.18
-0.246
-0.488
-0.897
-0.669
-0.601
-0.646
-0.564
-0.815
-0.455
-0.789

Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote
Dickinson Wright
Dickstein Shapiro
Dinsmore & Shohl
DLA Piper
Dorsey & Whitney
Dow Lohnes
Downey Brand
Drinker Biddle & Reath
Duane Morris
Dykema Gossett
Eckert Seamans
Edwards Wildman Palmer
Epstein Becker & Green
Faegre & Benson
Farella Braun + Martel
Fennemore Craig
Fenwick & West
Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner
Fish & Richardson
Fisher & Phillips
Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto
Foley & Lardner
Foley & Mansfield
Foley Hoag
Ford & Harrison
Foster Pepper
Fowler White Boggs
Fox Rothschild
Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy
Fredrikson & Byron
Freeborn & Peters
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
Frost Brown Todd
Fulbright & Jaworski
Gardere Wynne Sewell
Gibbons
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
Godfrey & Kahn
Goldberg Segalla
Goodwin Procter
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Pittsburgh
Detroit
Washington, D.C.
Cincinnati
Chicago
Minneapolis
Washington, D.C.
Sacramento
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Chicago
Pittsburgh
Boston
New York
Minneapolis
San Francisco
Phoenix
Mountain View
Washington, D.C.
Boston
Atlanta
New York
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Boston
Atlanta
Seattle
Tampa
Philadelphia
New York
Minneapolis
Chicago
New York
Cincinnati
Houston
Dallas
Newark, NJ
Los Angeles
Milwaukee
Buffalo, NY
Boston

-0.053
0.012
-0.412
0.208
-0.674
-0.629
-0.255
-0.587
-0.41
-0.326
-0.016
-0.057
-0.685
-0.576
-0.604
-1.076
0.157
-0.92
-0.423
-0.629
0.22
-0.376
-0.341
-0.57
-0.819
-0.042
-0.654
0.058
-0.365
-0.574
-0.664
-0.139
-0.674
0.225
0.026
0.102
-0.299
-0.297
-0.335
-0.339
-0.747

Gordon & Rees
Goulston & Storrs
Gray Plant Mooty
GrayRobinson
Greenberg Traurig
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale
Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart
Hahn Loeser & Parks
Hall Booth Smith & Slover
Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman
Hanson Bridgett
Harness, Dickey & Pierce
Harris Beach
Harter Secrest & Emery
Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young LLP
Haynes and Boone
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd
Herrick, Feinstein
Hinckley, Allen & Snyder
Hinshaw & Culbertson
Hiscock & Barclay
Hodgson Russ
Hogan Lovells
Holland & Hart
Holland & Knight
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn
Howard & Howard
Hughes Hubbard & Reed
Hunton & Williams
Husch Blackwell
Ice Miller
Irell & Manella
Jackson Kelly
Jackson Lewis LLP
Jackson Walker
Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell
Jenner & Block
Jones Day
Jones, Walker, Waechter
K&L Gates
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman

San Francisco
Boston
Minneapolis
Orlando
New York
St. Louis
West Palm Beach
Cleveland
Atlanta
Indianapolis
San Francisco
Troy, Michigan
Rochester, NY
Rochester, NY
Atlanta
Dallas
Greenville, SC
New York
Boston
Chicago
Syracuse, NY
Buffalo
Washington, D.C.
Denver
Tampa
Detroit
Royal Oak, MI
New York
Richmond
St. Louis
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Charleston, WV
Los Angeles
Dallas
Los Angeles
Chicago
New York
New Orleans
Pittsburgh
New York
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-0.593
-0.919
-0.778
0.207
-0.426
-0.563
0.081
-0.071
0.4
0.306
-0.937
0.166
-0.084
-0.13
-0.053
0.131
0.241
-0.639
-0.507
-0.365
0.201
-0.292
-0.585
-0.596
-0.382
0.265
-0.043
-0.662
0.11
-0.319
0.274
-0.602
0.195
-0.3
0.34
-0.516
-0.785
-0.213
0.423
-0.562
-0.36

Katten Muchin Rosenman
Kaufman & Canoles
Kaye Scholer
Kean Miller
Kelley Drye & Warren
Kelly Hart & Hallman
Kenyon & Kenyon
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
King & Spalding
Kirkland & Ellis
Kirton McConkie
Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel
Krieg DeVault
Kutak Rock
Lane Powell
Latham & Watkins
Lathrop & Gage
Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi
LeClairRyan
Leonard, Street and Deinard
Lewis and Roca
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
Lewis, Rice & Fingersh
Lindquist & Vennum
Litchfield Cavo
Littler Mendelson
Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell
Loeb & Loeb
Lowenstein Sandler
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips
Margolis Edelstein
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Mayer Brown
Maynard, Cooper & Gale
McAfee & Taft
McCarter & English
McDermott Will & Emery
McDonald Hopkins
McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter
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Chicago
Norfolk, VA
New York
Baton Rouge
New York
Fort Worth
New York
Atlanta
Atlanta
Chicago
Salt Lake City
Irvine
New York
Indianapolis
Omaha
Seattle
New York
Kansas City, MO
San Francisco
Richmond
Minneapolis
Phoenix
Los Angeles
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Chicago
San Francisco
Dallas
New York
Roseland, NJ
San Diego
Los Angeles
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Chicago
Birmingham, AL
Oklahoma City
Newark, NJ
Chicago
Cleveland
Morristown, NJ

-0.759
-0.002
-0.68
0.308
-0.495
0.422
-0.853
-0.221
-0.097
-0.363
0.508
-0.063
-0.626
0.446
-0.229
-0.561
-0.561
-0.075
-0.813
-0.265
-0.824
-0.414
-0.417
-0.428
-0.652
-0.397
-0.502
0.124
-0.779
-0.595
-0.004
-0.64
-0.211
-0.097
-0.503
0.102
0.447
-0.311
-0.455
0.364
-0.169

McGlinchey Stafford
McGuireWoods
McKenna Long & Aldridge
McKool Smith
McNair Law Firm
McNees Wallace & Nurick
Michael Best & Friedrich
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Miles & Stockbridge
Miller & Martin
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp
Moore & Van Allen
Morgan & Morgan
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
Morris, Manning & Martin
Morrison & Foerster
Morrison Mahoney
Munger, Tolles & Olson
Murtha Cullina
Neal Gerber & Eisenberg
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Nexsen Pruet
Nixon Peabody
Norris McLaughlin & Marcus
Nossaman
Nutter McClennen & Fish
Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart
O’Melveny & Myers
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein
Parsons Behle & Latimer
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler
Patton Boggs
Paul Hastings
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Pepper Hamilton
Perkins Coie
Phelps Dunbar
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New Orleans
Richmond
Atlanta
Dallas
Columbia, SC
Harrisburg
Milwaukee
New York
Baltimore
Chattanooga
Detroit
Boston
Los Angeles
Charlotte, NC
Orlando
Philadelphia
Atlanta
San Francisco
Boston
Los Angeles
Hartford, CT
Chicago
Columbia, SC
Columbia, SC
Boston
Bridgewater, NJ
Los Angeles
Boston
Baltimore
Greenville, SC
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Charlotte, NC
Salt Lake City
New York
Washington, D.C.
New York
New York
Philadelphia
Seattle
New Orleans

0.201
-0.225
-0.17
-0.253
0.181
-0.014
-0.117
-0.492
-0.062
0.387
-0.008
-0.706
-0.738
-0.06
-0.511
-0.385
0.078
-0.943
-0.563
-0.881
-0.484
-0.741
0.025
0.239
-0.508
-0.265
-0.441
-0.643
-0.351
-0.029
-0.696
-0.853
-0.283
-0.216
-0.743
-0.279
-0.362
-0.764
-0.385
-0.675
0.452

Phillips Lytle
Pierce Atwood
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman
Plunkett Cooney
Polsinelli Shughart
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur
Post & Schell
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch
Proskauer Rose
Pryor Cashman
Quarles & Brady
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer
Rawle & Henderson
Reed Smith
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren
Reminger
Richards, Layton & Finger
Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti
Rivkin Radler
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi
Robinson & Cole
Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson
Roetzel & Andress
Ropes & Gray
Rutan & Tucker
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite
Saul Ewing
Schiff Hardin
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis
Schulte Roth & Zabel
Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt
Sedgwick
Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney
Selman Breitman
Seward & Kissel
Seyfarth Shaw
Shearman & Sterling
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
Sherman & Howard

Buffalo
Portland, Maine
Washington, D.C.
Bloomfield Hills, MI
Kansas City, MO
Columbus, OH
Philadelphia
San Diego
New York
New York
Milwaukee
New York
Miami
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Milwaukee
Cleveland
Wilmington, DE
Morristown, NJ
Uniondale, NY
San Diego
Minneapolis
Hartford
Charlotte, NC
Akron
Boston
Costa Mesa
Phoenix
Philadelphia
Chicago
Philadelphia
New York
Portland, OR
San Francisco
Chicago
Los Angeles
New York
Chicago
New York
Los Angeles
Denver
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-0.414
-0.43
-0.532
-0.018
-0.301
0.197
-0.178
-0.404
-0.6
-0.555
-0.352
-0.953
-0.376
0.081
-0.443
-0.042
0.196
-0.083
-0.203
-0.182
-0.939
-0.817
-0.662
0.033
0.28
-0.711
-0.08
0.32
-0.354
-0.839
-0.444
-0.697
-0.342
-0.347
-0.917
-0.755
-0.549
-0.632
-0.578
-0.249
-0.563

Shipman & Goodwin
Shook, Hardy & Bacon
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick
Shutts & Bowen
Sidley Austin
Sills Cummis & Gross
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
Smith Moore Leatherwood
Smith, Gambrell & Russell
SmithAmundsen
Snell & Wilmer
SNR Denton
Spilman Thomas & Battle
Squire Sanders
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Steptoe & Johnson PLLC
Stevens & Lee
Stinson Morrison Hecker
Stites & Harbison
Stoel Rives
Stoll Keenon Ogden
Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young
Strasburger & Price
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan
Sullivan & Cromwell
Sullivan & Worcester
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister
Thompson & Knight
Thompson Coburn
Thompson Hine
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons
Tressler
Troutman Sanders
Ulmer & Berne
Varnum
Vedder Price
Venable
Vinson & Elkins
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease

Hartford
Kansas City, MO
Toledo
Miami
Chicago
Newark, NJ
New York
New York
Greensboro
Atlanta
Chicago
Phoenix
New York
Charleston, WV
Cleveland
Washington, D.C.
Charleston, WV
Reading, PA
Kansas City, MO
Louisville
Portland, OR
Lexington, KY
Philadelphia
Dallas
New York
New York
Boston
Atlanta
Cincinnati
Dallas
St. Louis
Cleveland
Dallas
Chicago
Atlanta
Cleveland
Grand Rapids, MI
Chicago
Washington, D.C.
Houston
Columbus, Ohio
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-0.593
-0.271
0.194
-0.158
-0.608
-0.418
-0.719
-0.629
0.042
0.133
-0.526
-0.055
-0.62
0.066
-0.154
-0.298
-0.29
-0.113
-0.426
0.033
-0.715
0.22
-0.34
0.292
-0.523
-0.492
-0.41
-0.18
0.31
0.227
-0.272
-0.178
0.249
-0.362
-0.031
-0.09
0.449
-0.248
-0.374
0.223
0.028

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis
Warner Norcross & Judd
Weil, Gotshal & Manges
White & Case
White and Williams
Whiteford, Taylor & Preston
Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford
Wiggin and Dana
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer
Wiley Rein
Williams & Connolly
Williams Mullen
Willkie Farr & Gallagher
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf
Winstead
Winston & Strawn
Wolff & Samson
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice
Wood Smith Henning & Berman
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs

66

New York
Nashville
Grand Rapids, MI
New York
New York
Philadelphia
Baltimore
Miami
New Haven
Woodbridge, NJ
Washington
Washington
Richmond
New York
Washington, D.C.
New York
Palo Alto
New York
Dallas
Chicago
West Orange, NJ
Winston-Salem, NC
Los Angeles
Louisville, KY

-0.478
-0.053
0.658
-0.534
-0.494
-0.258
-0.643
-0.063
-0.885
-0.534
-0.027
-0.735
0.082
-0.578
-0.837
-0.406
-0.658
-0.346
0.326
-0.382
-0.219
-0.093
0.028
0.089

